In the last two weeks, Donald Trump has repeatedly mentioned the possibility of holding “conversations” with the government of Nicolás Maduro.
This tactical rhetorical shift sharply contrasts with the order given to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to increase clandestine operations, psychological warfare, and the infiltration of mercenaries into Venezuelan territory; economic coercion; sabotage against critical infrastructure; the deployment of naval military forces in the Caribbean Sea in a zone located 80 to 160 kilometers from the Venezuelan coast, and simulated landing operations on the beaches of Puerto Rico and Trinidad and Tobago, to which was added the warning from the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to civil airlines, which could face a “potentially dangerous situation” when flying over the South American country's airspace, “due to the worsening security situation and the increase in military activity”.
Without specifying what type of threats they might face, the FAA's communication states that these “could pose a potential risk to aircraft at all altitudes”, even for those that remain on the ground.
In the context of this escalation of maximum political, military, and psychological coercion, the apparent openness and change in tone from Trump—who is neither an isolationist nor a pacifist and has succumbed to the deep state—responds largely to the containment capacity of the Venezuelan government, which has thus far known how to thwart everything from terrorist attacks to false flag operations, including the increased coercive tension combined with the geopolitical blockade of its naval assets by rapid deployment troops, about which the hegemonic American press and its followers around the world echo daily as part of the same regime change strategy.
Since the objective of overthrowing Maduro through an institutional break—particularly within the Bolivarian National Armed Forces—has not been fulfilled, Trump needs to recalibrate his belligerent strategy, given the stalemate from the actions undertaken for months and their wear and tear.
To this is added the advance of multilateralism with China and Russia as central actors, which act as a political, diplomatic, and military counterweight that limits the United States' ability to impose its plan.
According to the hawk Elliott Abrams, who served as special representative for Venezuela during the first Trump administration, the current occupant of the White House lacks “clarity” on what to do in Venezuela, but must “eliminate” his “doubts” and “ambiguities,” and militarily attack the “dictator” Maduro's regime within its territory.
Former Undersecretary of State for Latin America in the Reagan administration and a prominent member of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR, New York, 1921, the main think tank of the “deep state”), in an article in the magazine Foreign Affairs (11/20/25), the institution's official mouthpiece, Abrams, one of the architects of Trump's plan for the partition of Gaza, asserts that the president's advisors should convince him that “the point of no return has passed: the game is afoot, and either he wins or Maduro wins”.
Entitled “How to topple Maduro: why regime change is the only way forward in Venezuela,” in his article Abrams acknowledges that “it would not be prudent or necessary to deploy ground forces in Venezuela,” but affirms that creating the conditions for Maduro's fall “will require attacking something more than drug-running boats in international waters”.
In particular, the struggle between the factions that support him and compete with each other with divergent agendas: the MAGA block, now divided by decisions and gestures that many consider a deviation from its foundational promise: “Make America great again”; neoliberal hawks, focused on economic imposition with an axis on oil, and interventionist neoconservatives who bet on direct confrontation.
Therefore, he proposes that Washington expand its “list of objectives,” and to protect U.S. aircraft that might attack targets in Venezuela, “Venezuela's air defense systems, the F-16 aircraft at Palo Negro Air Base, and the Sukhoi jets at the air base located on La Orchila, an island about 160 kilometers off the coast” should be destroyed.
They should also attack “the bases in western Venezuela used by the National Liberation Army (ELN), a Colombian terrorist group allied with Maduro and also dedicated to drug trafficking”.
Directed at exploiting Trump's “malignant narcissism,” Abrams argues that the “danger” for him and his administration lies in that “after much chest-thumping” and a demonstration of naval force, they end up leaving Maduro in power, which would demonstrate that U.S. influence in the subcontinent is “limited,” and to the detriment of the empire's national security, it would benefit the Venezuelan regime and hostile countries like China, Russia, Cuba, and Iran.
However, in terms of game theory and cost-benefit calculations, Abrams' plan implies some greater risks, and Trump knows it: Venezuela could pass into a phase of prolonged resistance with guerrilla tactics and sabotage actions, and some marines would return to the United States in plastic bags.
The pressure did not work, and he now resorts to the language of “dialogue” as a maneuver to reposition himself, a turn that also reflects contradictions within his movement and the U.S. state apparatus itself.
